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An Ethical Consideration of the Concept 
of Sustainability in ESD:
The Arguments of Derek Parfit and Hitoshi Nagai
平田　仁胤
　The study critically examines the concept of sustainability by focusing on the arguments 
of Derek Parfit and Hitoshi Nagai. The concept of sustainability is based on that of 
intergenerational ethics, which asserts the rights of future generations. Parfit’s thought 
experiment “Depletion” shows that we cannot make assumptions about the characteristics of 
future generations in order to guarantee their rights because of the Non-Identity Problem. 
Nagai suggests that our ethics are derived from inverted moral and ethical values, and that 
intergenerational ethics underpinning the concept of Education for Sustainable Development 
is rooted in the present generational ethics as our inverted values.
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1. Introduction
　This study aims to critically examine the concept 
of sustainability, one of the key concepts in 
Education for Sustainable Development (ESD), 
focusing on the arguments of British ethicist Derek 
Parfit and Japanese philosopher Hitoshi Nagai.
　The basis of the concept of the sustainable 
construction of ESD is laid out in the Declaration of 
Thessaloniki, which states that the concept of 
sustainability includes “not only environment but 
also poverty, population, health, food security, 
democracy, human rights and peace,” and ends by 
stating that “in the final analysis, [this is] a moral 
and ethical imperative.”
　The Declaration explains the broad nature of the 
concept of sustainability, including its moral and 
ethical dimensions. However, it raises the question, 
what does “moral and ethical imperative” mean? 
One of the answers to this question might be 
intergenerational ethics.1) This is because the 
concept logically entails solicitude for the quality of 
the lives of future generations. It seems obvious that 
it is morally and ethically good to leave sound 
environments and natural resources for future 
generations to receive and enjoy. Our present deeds 
may contribute to increasing the quality of life of 
the next generation. The World Commission on 
Environment and Development: Our Common 
Future states that the preservation of the Earth’s 
resources is “our moral obligation” in order to 
guarantee “inter-generational equity.” As Shigetaka 
Imai (2008, p.124) points out, citing the United 
Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable 
Development Japan Report, intergenerational ethics 
that “do not put the burden on the next generation” 
is one of the fundamental concepts of sustainability.
　However, if we accept that a moral and ethical 
imperative involves intergenerational ethics, there 
still remains an unanswered question: what does it 
mean to make assumpt ions r ega rd ing the 
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characteristics of future generations? If future 
generations will not be the same as the present 
generations, how can we make assumptions about 
future generations’ rights? Although a number of 
educational and ethical studies have discussed 
intergenerational ethics, no scholars apart from 
Derek Parfit have answered this question. Such 
studies make assumptions about future generations 
and c la im that present generat ions have a 
responsibility to guarantee their rights (Glover, 
1984; Jonas, 1979; Kato, 1991, 2005; Kira, 2019; 
Sakai, 2013, 2014).
　Therefore, this study refers to Parfit’s argument 
t o s h o w w h a t i t  a c t u a l l y m e a n s t o m a k e 
assumptions about the characteristics of future 
generations when we discuss their rights. Nagai’s 
argument then indicates how we should think of 
future generations.
2. Parfit’s Challenge: The Non-Identity Problem
2.1. Depletion or Conservation
　Parfit’s thought experiment “Depletion” must first 
be explained:
　Depletion. As a community, we must choose 
whether to deplete or conserve certain kinds of 
resources. If we choose Depletion, the quality of 
life over the next two centuries would be slightly 
higher than it would have been if we had chosen 
Conservation. But it would later, for many 
centuries, be much lower than it would have been 
if we had chosen Conservation. This would be 
because, at the start of this period, people would 
have to find alternatives for the resources that we 
had depleted…. (Parfit, 1984, p. 362)
It is not necessary to discuss the differences 
between Great Depletion and Lesser Depletion 
because they are not relevant to the aims of this 
study (see Figure 1). The point here is that if we 
choose Depletion, future generations will have a 
much lower quality of life than if Conservation is 
chosen. Thus, in order to guarantee the rights of 
future generations, it is fair to say that conservation 
is a morally and ethically better choice than 
Depletion because it is sure to improve the quality 
of life of future generations.
　However, Parfit questions how we value the 
quality of life of future generations after the choice 
is made between Depletion and Conservation 
because people in an After-Depletion-World and 
those in an After-Conservation-World will not be 
identical. Choosing the route of Depletion could 
cause the over-exploitation of the Earth’s resources, 
the destruction of the natural environment, and the 
increase of harmful nuclear waste. Moreover, it 
could a lso affec t the popula t ion of fu ture 
generations and their personalities; in other words, 
i t could change thei r physica l and menta l 
characterist ics. The personali t ies of future 
generations who live in the After-Depletion-World 
and in After-Conservation-World would be purely 
and total ly different from those of current 
generations. If we consider the After-Depletion 
generation, we would choose Conservation to avoid 
decreasing their quality of life and to guarantee 
their rights, but we could not reach out to help 
them. Those we tried to reach out to would not 
exist, as there would only be those in an After-
Conservation-World because we would have chosen 
the route of Conservation.
　Contrary to our common sense, we can never 
empathize with the generations of both worlds at 
the same time, and furthermore, we can never tell 
which choice could make people’s lives better. 
Another of Parfit’s anecdotes may help illustrate 
this point in a more concrete manner. Some years 
ago, a British politician welcomed the fact that 
there had been fewer teenage pregnancies in recent 
years. In response, a middle-aged man wrote an 
angry letter to The Times. He had been born when 
Fig.1: Depletion (Parfit, 1984, p.361-2)
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his mother was fourteen. He admitted that because 
his mother was so young, his early years had been 
difficult, but his life was now well worth living 
(Parfit, 1984, p.364). Here, Parfit raises the question, 
“[w]as the politician suggesting that it would have 
been better if [the man] had never been born?” 
Parfit’s answer is no. The story explains the point of 
the thought experiment “Depletion” : people will be 
able to live happy lives no matter which world we 
choose because, in believing that life itself is worth 
living, they live in each world separately and cannot 
weigh the differences between these two worlds. 
Whether we choose a world of Depletion or 
Conservation, future generations’ lives may be 
paradoxically happy. Parfit calls this the “Non-
Identity Problem” (Parfit, 1984, p.359)
　Parfit’s “Depletion” sheds light on the argument 
for the rights of future generations. Intergenerational 
ethics claims that present generations have the duty 
to ensure that the rights of future generations are 
upheld. According to Our Common Future, the 
“Fundamental Human Right” is to “an environment 
adequate for [individuals’] health and well being.” 
As Takayuki Kira explains, “future generations 
have the right to enjoy [a] sound environment, 
meanwhile the present generations have the duty to 
keep and provide it” (Kira, 2019, p.140). The 
underlining of this responsibility involves a moral 
and ethical presupposition that future generations 
should not suffer from a poor environment.
　As Parfit states, however, if we choose to engage 
in Conservation to guarantee future generations’ 
rights, the people in an After-Conservation-World 
will not be identical to those in an After-Depletion-
World. Thus, arguments based on future generations’ 
rights seem to be unjustifiable.
2.2. Two Objections to Parfit’s Conclusion
　Although Parfit’s argument is valid, it does not 
meet our expectations that we should be able to 
imagine future generations and, in fact, choose to 
help them. Parfit himself tried to find Theory X to 
solve the nonidentity problem because he was not 
convinced by this conclusion. However, in his 
Reasons and Persons, he was not able to find 
Theory X after all; this remains a challenge that we 
must face.
　In the following sections, I show the difficulty of 
addressing this problem and finding Theory X.
(1) The “Grasping it Loosely Argument”
　One of the appropriate arguments that can be 
used to solve the aforementioned problem is to 
grasp the identity of future generations loosely. This 
argument asserts that Parfit’s criterion for a 
person’s identity is too strict. We normally do not 
categorize future generations into “worlds” by 
means of their personal identities when considering 
their rights and making attempts to guarantee them. 
Assuming that Parfit’s argument is correct, we can 
make assumptions about future generations without 
any difficulties. In this study, I call this argument 
Grasping it Loosely Argument (GLA). It seems to 
be successful and persuasive because it appeals to 
our expectations (Kira, 2019, p.140).2)
　However, the GLA, which Parfit calls the 
“No-Difference View,” gives rise to another 
problem (ibid., 1984, p.369). Parfit explains this as 
follows:
　If in either of two possible outcomes the same 
number of people would ever live, it will be 
worse if those who live are worse off, or have a 
lower quality of life, than those who would have 
lived. (p.369)
Thus, regardless of personal differences in the two 
possible worlds, it is worse if people have a lower 
quality of life, and vice versa.
　Parfit considers whether this is valid through a 
thought experiment (see Figure 2). The width of 
Fig. 2: Two Blocks (Parfit, 1984, p.385)
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each block shows the number of people living and 
the height shows their quality of life. A refers to 
present generat ions and B refers to future 
generations. In B, there are twice as many people 
living as in A, and these people are all worse off 
than those in A. However, the lives of those in B, 
compared with those in A, are more than half as 
much worth living. As Figure 2 indicates, the space 
of B is larger than that of A. Comparing the quality 
of life in A and B, people in B have lives that are 
more worth living than those of people in A.
　If we admit that Parfit’s argument is persuasive, 
we cannot avoid a slippery slope argument (see 
Figure 3). B would be better than A, and according 
to the same reasoning, C would be better than B, 
and finally, Z would be the best. Z is an enormous 
population whose members have lives that are not 
very high above the level at which life ceases to be 
worth living. Even if Z could almost only have hard 
lives, it could be the outcome with the greatest total 
sum of happiness. Parfit calls this “the Repugnant 
conclusion” and describes it as follows.
　The Repugnant conclusion: For any possible 
population of at least ten billion people, all with a 
very high quality of life, there must be some 
much larger imaginable population whose 
existence, if other things are equal, would be 
better, even though its members have lives that 
are barely worth living. (Parfit, 1984, p.388)
　Here, it becomes clear that in his search for 
Theory X, Parfit cannot avoid a dilemma. On the 
one hand, if we accept the nonidentity problem, we 
cannot assess the differences in the quality of life of 
future generations in each world because they are 
non-identical people. On the other hand, if we 
assume the no-difference view in order to avoid the 
nonidentity problem, we must agree that ten billion 
people will have lives that are barely worth living. 
Therefore, the GLA is insufficient as a counter 
argument to the nonidentity problem because it 
cannot avoid the repugnant conclusion.3)
(2) Humanity Should Be Argument
　The other counter argument to the problem is the 
“Humanity Should Be Argument” (HSBA) proposed 
by Hans Jonas (1984) that made great contributions to 
intergenerational ethics. Jonas criticizes traditional 
Western ethics because it presupposes the reciprocity 
of the present generations and does not take future 
generations into account. His aim in The Imperative of 
Responsibility is to prove our responsibility for future 
people.
　According to Jonas, metabolism (Stoffwechsel) is 
one of the ontological features of humanity. Human 
beings are constantly constructing components of 
their bodies through ingestion and digestion. The 
fact that human beings always live at the risk of 
los ing thei r own l ives represents the f i rs t 
imperative, that “there should be humanity in the 
future,” and then shows life is “good in itself (Gut-
an-sich).” Jonas shows uses a suckling baby as an 
example of the imperative. The baby’s mother, not 
without resistance but inevitably, responds to the 
Fig. 3: The Repugnant Conclusion (Parfit, 1984, p.388)
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baby’s voice and then takes care of it when hearing 
it. Jonas concludes that the present generations 
should be responsible for future generations’ lives.
　However, Jonas’s first imperative still has a 
serious problem in terms of Parfit’s argument. It 
cannot avoid a repugnant conclusion. If humanity is 
good in itself, as mentioned above in Figure 3, A is 
better than B, and Z is the best world because the 
more people there are, the better.
　Even though I have briefly treated only two 
counter arguments to the nonidentity problem, it 
seems to me that there are no sufficient objections 
to it. However, like Parfit, I feel I can hardly accept 
it. Are there no foundations for intergenerational 
ethics if Parfit’s argument is reasonable? I believe 
the answer is no. Parfit’s argument does not indicate 
the limitations of intergenerational ethics but its 
characteristics.
　In the following section, I will attempt to 
illustrate these characteristics by referring to the 
work of Japanese philosopher Hitoshi Nagai. Nagai 
persuasively explains why we should be moral from 
an egoistic perspective, and contributes to resolving 
our problem of intergenerational ethics.
3. Nagai’s Critics of Ethics
　At the outset, Nagai (2011) explains prototypical 
moral problems with an argument that criticizes 
ethics itself as a whole. The meaning of morally 
good and bad originates from each person’s sense 
of good and bad. Something worth enjoying for 
someone is good, while something that interferes 
with or impairs it is bad. When something is good 
for a person, as well as for others, and vice versa, 
moral problems never arise.
　However, when something good for someone 
turns out to be bad for another person, moral 
problems occur. To put this concretely, it is good for 
someone to destroy the natural environment, 
exhaust resources, and so on if they are able to 
enjoy their life by doing so. In contrast, it is bad for 
another to do so if they suffer from it. Regarding 
moral or ethical issues, we must not forget to 
consider the positionalities of persons; namely, 
when explaining that something is good or bad, we 
must make explicit who enjoys it and who suffers 
from it (Nagai, 2011, p.17). When someone’s pursuit 
of happiness results in a number of unhappy lives, it 
is necessary to prohibit it. Furthermore, this must be 
done in a manner that decreases the person’s 
dissatisfaction and increases their satisfaction with 
the prohibitions. Here, there is a need for a way to 
constrain and satisfy people at the same time.
　According to Nagai, the discourse of ethics in the 
long history of humanity has reversed actual bad 
into moral or ethical good. A thought experiment of 
the Gyges’ ring in Plato’s Republic might help us. 
The r ing has magic power that makes you 
transparent whenever you want be with no risks. In 
other words, the ring-wearer can engage in any kind 
of wrongdoing at any time and never be discovered. 
Plato, through Socrates, insists that one can never 
be happy by doing wrong, and that what makes one 
happy is doing good, arguing against the idea that 
humanity would love to do wrong if they had the 
ring. Following Nagai’s explanation, one of the 
roles of ethics is to turn bad into good by convincing 
people that something that is bad for them, but good 
for others, is, in fact, good for them, too.
　Nagai claims that ethicists have tried to convince 
us to accept this inversion of values: good is bad, 
and bad is good. In this sense, one refrains from 
doing something good for oneself and bad for 
others and wishes to do something good for others 
and bad for oneself because one is convinced that 
doing something bad for others must be, in any 
case, bad for oneself, too. It becomes bad to destroy 
the natural environment, exhaust resources, and so 
on, when the values are reversed, even if you can 
enjoy a happier life by doing so.
　In comparing the deontology of Kant and 
utilitarianism, Nagai reveals that they have 
constructed a cooperative relationship with each 
other. General ly speaking, deontology and 
utilitarianism are mutually exclusive. According 
to the Kantian view, being moral or ethical depends 
on fulfilling imperative duties. For example, the 
duty not to “make a promise with the intention not 
to keep it” must be followed anytime, anywhere, or 
in any case because it is one of the duties we must 
follow regardless of its benefits. However, for a 
utilitarian, it is not important whether promises 
should be kept or not, but whether they can produce 
“the greatest happiness of the greatest number” 
because being moral or ethical means bringing as 
many benefits as possible. If telling a lie can 
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Fig. 3: The Repugnant Conclusion (Parfit, 1984, p.388)
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produce benefits, it is regarded as a moral or ethical 
deed. The gap between Kant and utilitarianism lies 
in the criterion for judging morality. Kant’s 
deontology emphasizes fulfilling duties, while 
utilitarianism values gaining benefits.
　However, Nagai points out that these perspectives 
sometimes enter into a partnership. It is good to 
fulfill Kant’s imperative duties, regardless of 
whether it serves some benefits. Many people feel 
good when they do not “make a promise with the 
intention not to keep it,” even if that entails many 
disadvantages, because they are already convinced 
of the inverted values (Nagai, 2011, pp.225-227).
　Nagai’s argument makes a great contribution to 
intergenerational ethics. As Parfit has explained, 
when assuming future generations’ quality of life, 
we have to face the dilemma that if we undertake 
the nonident i ty problem or the repugnant 
conclusion in spite of the GLA and HSBA, there still 
remains the troubling question of how we can assume 
future generations and consider intergenerational 
ethics.
　Nagai’s suggestion gives a new angle to this 
dilemma. Following his explanation, the essence of 
ethics lies in inverted values, where something 
actually good (bad) is turned into something 
morally and ethically bad (good). Moral and ethical 
values always cover actual values. As Nagai 
uncovered above, when considering moral values, 
we must think of positionalities, that is, who enjoys 
or suffers. However, in the context of arguments for 
intergenerational ethics, describing them strictly is 
almost impossible because a person from a future 
generation has not yet come into the world. Parfit’s 
nonidentity problem is caused by that reason. In 
contrast , Parfi t inevitably encountered the 
repugnant conclusion by trying to respond to this 
issue. This dilemma indicates that our ethics of 
inverted values are originally rooted in personal 
values , which ar ises i f we t ry to underpin 
intergenerational ethics apart from personal 
positions. 
　So what we should do here, in the light of the 
arguments of Parfit and Nagai, is to consider 
future generations based on our generation’s 
inverted values, rather than to make assumptions 
about them directly. Personal values are always the 
drivers of intergenerational ethics. In this sense, 
intergenerational ethics is not directly related to 
future generations, but our present generation. It is 
suggestive that Jonas uses the example of a suckling 
baby to suggest the imperative of humanity. This is 
because the picture of future generations assumed by 
Jonas is, different from Parfit’s thought experiment, 
exactly the future generations within the reach of the 
present generations, that is, those that are in touch 
with our values.
　Parfit’s argument paradoxically shows that 
intergenerational ethics is not a challenging 
responsibility for future generations, but is based on 
the inverted values of our present generations.
4. Conclusion
　This study critically examined the concept of 
sustainability by focusing on the arguments of 
Parfit and Nagai and found that the concept of 
intergenerational ethics underpinning the concept of 
ESD is rooted in the inverted values of the present 
generation. 
　It might be obvious and unsurprising to see the 
Kyoto Protocol as a “failure”; however, it could 
provide a suggestion for education for sustainability. 
It would answer questions such as why we should 
be responsible for future generations, and should we 
first devote ourselves to our own issues because 
they are never in touch with us? One of the answers 
to these questions could be that responsibilities for 
future generations are those for the present 
generation. We think of future generations because 
it brings us an inverted good. Ignoring the future 
involves ignoring those living in the present. 
Besides, some members of future generations are 
strongly connected to the present; like Jonas’s 
suckling baby, they are already within us.
　Although this study did not discuss how to 
convince people of inverted values, it should first 
be clarified that sustainability for future generations 
reflects our generations’ positionalities.
Notes
1)　The term “intergenerational just ice” or 
“intergenerational equity” is commonly used in 
the context of ethics. “Intergenerational ethics” is 
generally used in Japan because Hisatake Kato, 
one of the most important Japanese ethicists, used 
it in his pioneering study Encouragement of 
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Environmental Ethics. Thus, this study uses the 
term “intergenerational ethics” owing to Kato’s 
study (Yoshinaga, 2012, p.180).
2)　Kira (2019, p.140) presents another argument to 
grasp the causal pathway loosely by proposing that 
personal identities do not depend only on genetic 
identities. In this study, I do not treat the genetic 
view because the difference between the two 
arguments does not cause any serious problems.
3)　As his use of the word “repugnant” suggests, 
Parfit finds this conclusion hard to accept (p.388).
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Appendix
　This study is based on a draft for an oral 
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produce benefits, it is regarded as a moral or ethical 
deed. The gap between Kant and utilitarianism lies 
in the criterion for judging morality. Kant’s 
deontology emphasizes fulfilling duties, while 
utilitarianism values gaining benefits.
　However, Nagai points out that these perspectives 
sometimes enter into a partnership. It is good to 
fulfill Kant’s imperative duties, regardless of 
whether it serves some benefits. Many people feel 
good when they do not “make a promise with the 
intention not to keep it,” even if that entails many 
disadvantages, because they are already convinced 
of the inverted values (Nagai, 2011, pp.225-227).
　Nagai’s argument makes a great contribution to 
intergenerational ethics. As Parfit has explained, 
when assuming future generations’ quality of life, 
we have to face the dilemma that if we undertake 
the nonident i ty problem or the repugnant 
conclusion in spite of the GLA and HSBA, there still 
remains the troubling question of how we can assume 
future generations and consider intergenerational 
ethics.
　Nagai’s suggestion gives a new angle to this 
dilemma. Following his explanation, the essence of 
ethics lies in inverted values, where something 
actually good (bad) is turned into something 
morally and ethically bad (good). Moral and ethical 
values always cover actual values. As Nagai 
uncovered above, when considering moral values, 
we must think of positionalities, that is, who enjoys 
or suffers. However, in the context of arguments for 
intergenerational ethics, describing them strictly is 
almost impossible because a person from a future 
generation has not yet come into the world. Parfit’s 
nonidentity problem is caused by that reason. In 
contrast , Parfi t inevitably encountered the 
repugnant conclusion by trying to respond to this 
issue. This dilemma indicates that our ethics of 
inverted values are originally rooted in personal 
values , which ar ises i f we t ry to underpin 
intergenerational ethics apart from personal 
positions. 
　So what we should do here, in the light of the 
arguments of Parfit and Nagai, is to consider 
future generations based on our generation’s 
inverted values, rather than to make assumptions 
about them directly. Personal values are always the 
drivers of intergenerational ethics. In this sense, 
intergenerational ethics is not directly related to 
future generations, but our present generation. It is 
suggestive that Jonas uses the example of a suckling 
baby to suggest the imperative of humanity. This is 
because the picture of future generations assumed by 
Jonas is, different from Parfit’s thought experiment, 
exactly the future generations within the reach of the 
present generations, that is, those that are in touch 
with our values.
　Parfit’s argument paradoxically shows that 
intergenerational ethics is not a challenging 
responsibility for future generations, but is based on 
the inverted values of our present generations.
4. Conclusion
　This study critically examined the concept of 
sustainability by focusing on the arguments of 
Parfit and Nagai and found that the concept of 
intergenerational ethics underpinning the concept of 
ESD is rooted in the inverted values of the present 
generation. 
　It might be obvious and unsurprising to see the 
Kyoto Protocol as a “failure”; however, it could 
provide a suggestion for education for sustainability. 
It would answer questions such as why we should 
be responsible for future generations, and should we 
first devote ourselves to our own issues because 
they are never in touch with us? One of the answers 
to these questions could be that responsibilities for 
future generations are those for the present 
generation. We think of future generations because 
it brings us an inverted good. Ignoring the future 
involves ignoring those living in the present. 
Besides, some members of future generations are 
strongly connected to the present; like Jonas’s 
suckling baby, they are already within us.
　Although this study did not discuss how to 
convince people of inverted values, it should first 
be clarified that sustainability for future generations 
reflects our generations’ positionalities.
Notes
1)　The term “intergenerational just ice” or 
“intergenerational equity” is commonly used in 
the context of ethics. “Intergenerational ethics” is 
generally used in Japan because Hisatake Kato, 
one of the most important Japanese ethicists, used 
it in his pioneering study Encouragement of 
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presentation titled, “An Ethical Consideration on 
the Concept of Sustainability: Derek Parfit and 
Hitoshi Nagai’s Challenges” presented at the Global 
Conference on Teacher Education for ESD held at 
Okayama University on November 23, 2019.
